










Most regulatory policies require government agencies to monitor the degree of compliance.  These
tasks are usually delegated to bureaucrats who, as self interested agents, may engage in corrupt
behaviour.  Opportunities for bribe taking are most likely to arise when the government (principal) is
imperfectly informed about the degree of compliance, but the bureaucrats (agents) are fully informed.
This paper outlines a strategy which may be employed to prevent corrupt behaviour.  It is
demonstrated that when agents behave strategically in a system with sequential inspections, honest
behaviour can be induced by generating sufficient uncertainty about the strategic position of each
agent.
JEL Classifications: H1, Q2, L5
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I. Introduction
Government regulators are plagued with problems resulting from the need to
monitor and enforce policies which are administered through bureaucrats, who act as
their agents.  The bureaucrats are thus endowed with discretionary powers.  If they are
assumed to be self interested, these delegated powers may be exploited for personal
gain, rather than the purposes intended by the policy makers.  Such problems abound,
particularly in developing countries, where corruption has been shown to undermine
government policy (Rose-Ackerman (1997)).  Common examples of corrupt activities
include bribe taking by: fire and health inspectors, police officers, tax auditors and
regulators with the authority to grant licenses to new businesses (Rose-Ackerman
(1978)).  Moreover, a growing body of empirical work suggests that corruption tends
to impede economic growth (Mauro (1995)).  Bardhan (1997) argues that this occurs
because development is accompanied by an expansion in the range of activities
through which corrupt officials may extract rents.  Other studies have demonstrated
that bribes are similar to distortionary taxes, which stifle the entry of new enterprises
and technologies (Krueger (1990), Manion (1996)).
In recent years corruption has intensified in a new domain – environmental
regulation.  The sphere of activities through which corrupt administrators can extract
bribes has increased, as more countries have ratified global environmental agreements
which require governments to regulate environmental performance.  Examples of such
international agreements include the Montreal Protocol on CFC emissions, the Kyoto
greenhouse gas agreement and the CITES convention on trade in endangered species
1.
                                                
1   For instance the CITES convention calls for a complete ban on the commercial use and trade of
species listed in Table 1.  This, however, has done little to halt the illegal trade of tiger bones and
organs from India to China (Tiger World (1998)) or rhinoceros horns from Africa and India to SE Asia
– both of which are demanded for their presumed therapeutic value.4
The emerging empirical literature on environmental compliance indicates that
corruption is one of the main sources of environmental degradation in several
countries.  For instance, Desai (1998) in a comparative study of ten countries
concludes that:
“The practice of large scale corruption ….. has stalled the implementation of
pollution control laws to a significant extent.  Industry owners commonly
perceive that public servants are to be bought by monetary incentives.” (page
172)
Similarly, in an econometric analysis of water pollution, Pargal, Mani and Huq (1997)
find that even when increased emissions prompt further inspections, these have no
subsequent impact on total emissions.  Corruption and low penalties are cited as the
main factors contributing to noncompliance.
Despite the prevalence of these problems, the consequences of bribery on
policy outcomes, remains one of the least researched aspects of economic behaviour.
Rose-Ackerman (1978) pioneered the formal analysis of corruption by examining the
link between institutional structures and the opportunities for rent-seeking.  Following
this lead, much of the existing theoretical literature on corruption deals with
monitoring problems which arise in a hierarchical structure, where a principal (such as
the government), confers supervisory powers upon a self interested agent (say an
inspector).  An issue, which has received considerable attention, is the use of incentive
payments and fines to deter bribe taking.  The central conclusions which emerge from
the literature are that: marginal increases in a fine imposed on the bribe taker simply
leads to higher bribes being paid in equilibrium (Mookherjee and Png
(1995)).  In contrast, penalties imposed on the bribe giver, unambiguously reduce the
level of corruption (Mookherjee and Png (Op cit), Basu et al (1992)).  Payment of a5
sufficiently high efficiency wage diminishes the gains from bribe taking and may
under certain conditions deter corruption (Beasley and McLaren (1990)).  Where
multiple supervisors police each other, corruption can at times be deterred by sending
subsequent supervisors with probability less than one (Kofman and Lawarree (1996)).
Finally, the social costs of corruption escalate in hierarchical systems where junior
officials are obliged to pay part of their bribes to superiors (Hillman and Katz (1987)).
In what follows, we focus upon a mechanism which may be employed to
prevent corruption when the payoffs from bribe taking are uncertain.  Intuitively, this
follows from the fact that agents will choose to offer a bribe only if it is likely to be
accepted.  A bribe in turn will be accepted only if the recipient believes that the
expected payoffs from acceptance of the offer, exceed those from rejection.  A
sufficient degree of uncertainty at either of these stages may be sufficient to render
honest behaviour the individually rational strategy.
We consider a model which is similar to that outlined by Mokherjee and Png
(1995).  A government regulator employs environmental inspectors to monitor
pollution emissions from two firms labeled i and j.  The regulator cannot directly
observe the level of pollution emitted by the firms.  However, the regulator knows that
the lower the aggregate level of reported emissions, the greater is the probability that a
bribe has been paid to an inspector to underreport true emission levels.  The regulator
may then choose to audit industry emissions.  The likelihood of an audit being
initiated is linked to the probability that emissions have been underreported.  With
some exogenously given probability, the audit unearths true emission levels and a fine
is imposed on both the firm (briber) and environmental inspector (recipient of the
bribe) for underreporting discharge levels.6
We begin by considering the incentives for bribe taking when the firms are
inspected sequentially by different inspectors and the order of inspections is common
knowledge.  Since the probability of detection and prosecution increases with the
degree of underreporting, the firm which is inspected first, enjoys a strategic
advantage.  To see why, suppose that firm i is inspected first and bribes its inspector
to underreport the true level of discharge.  Clearly, firm j’s optimum response depends
on firm i’s report.  The lower the level of emissions reported by firm i’s inspector, the
greater is the probability that an industry wide audit will be triggered, and the lower is
the incentive for firm j to underreport its emissions.  Thus, in equilibrium firm i and
its inspector take advantage of their position and report a lower level of emissions
than firm j.  Moreover, for certain parameters of the model, the inspector at firm i
accepts a bribe and reports zero emissions, while firm j’s inspector is compelled to
report discharge levels truthfully and receives no bribe.  More generally, it is
demonstrated that corruption cannot be deterred in this game if the probability of a
successful prosecution is sufficiently small.
We then extend the model by allowing the regulator to withhold information
about the order in which the firms are to be inspected.  It is demonstrated that if the
regulator randomises the order of inspections and makes this known to all parties,
bribe taking can be deterred.  Intuitively, this reflects the fact that if each firm and
inspector believe that there is a sufficiently high probability that they are to report
second, this diminishes the incentive to underreport emissions.  It is shown that there
exists a feasible set of probabilities and fines such that the regulator can induce
truthful reporting by the inspectors at both firms.  This result reflects the fact that
bribe taking is only feasible because the regulator (principal) is imperfectly informed
about emission levels, while firms and their inspectors (agents) are fully informed.  By7
generating uncertainty about the strategic position of each agent, the principal can
partly mitigate the informational advantage of the inspectors.  This in turn makes it
easier to implement policies which deter bribe taking and induce truthful reporting.
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Formally, the game is one of incomplete information, where each inspector
(and firm) is uncertain about the sequence of inspections and hence the rival’s payoffs.
Since the rival’s payoffs are unknown, the best response functions must be based on
expectations (i.e. announced probabilities) of the sequence of inspections. Given the
informational structure of the model, there can be no learning or updating of
probabilities, since an inspector has no way of determining whether a rival has
undertaken an inspection.
3
These results are, however, predicated on the assumption that collusion and
information sharing about the order of inspections can be prevented.  Where
institutional structures do not preclude communication, it is quite natural to expect
agents to exchange information to protect their rents.  We therefore outline a simple
device which renders such communication unprofitable.  Specifically, we consider a
reward and punishment strategy where an inspector (or firm) who initiates
unauthorised communication is fined with some probability, if reported by her rival.
The rival in turn is offered a reward for disclosing this information to the authorities.
It is demonstrated that if the reward and fine are sufficiently high the inspectors
confront a standard prisoners’ dilemma problem – the dominant strategy for each
inspector is to divulge information, even though both would be better off by
cooperating.  Thus, neither inspector initiates communication.
                                                
2  The mechanism outlined in this paper is analogous to that suggested by Maskin and Tirole (1990)
where imperfect information generated by the principal allows a superior equilibrium to be sustained.
3 The equilibrium is Bayes-Nash.  For a more rigorous characterisation of the properties see Osborne
and Rubinstein (1994).8
While the model presented here bears some similarity to that of Koffman and
Lawarree (1996), there are significant differences in structure and the mechanisms
through which corruption is deterred.  Firstly, Koffman and Lawarree analyse a
situation where two inspectors police each other.  In the current model there is only
one inspector assigned to each firm.  Moreover, Koffman and Lawarree do not
consider the possibility of collusion between inspectors
4.  This issue is explicitly
addressed in the current paper.  More importantly, the mechanisms through which
corruption is prevented differ markedly.  In the Kofman- Lawarree model, despite the
use of two inspectors to police each other, double supervision is suboptimal since it is
costly.  Thus, the second inspector is sent with probability less than one, when the first
submits a low (potentially fraudulent) report.  Corruption is deterred when the
principal offers the second inspector a high enough reward.  This occurs because once
the first inspector has been bribed, the briber is left with insufficient rent with which
to induce the second to collude.  In contrast, in the current paper uncertainty about the
order of inspections diminishes the gains to each inspector and firm from submitting a
dishonest report.
5  Since the expected gains from corruption are smaller, there exist a
feasible set of probabilities and fines such that the regulator can induce truthful
reporting by the inspectors at both firms.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows.  Section II outlines the
basic sequential model which we use as a benchmark to motivate the discussion in
Section III which deals with the case when the order of inspections is randomised.
                                                
4   Instead they consider whether the agent has an incentive to inform each inspector about the report of
her rival and the rival’s position.
5 Under uncertainty the bribe is chosen to maximise expected payoffs which are a weighted average of
the bribes of the first and second mover.9
Section IV provides a numerical example which gives an indication of the relative
magnitudes implied by the model.  Finally, Section V concludes the paper.
II The Model
An industry with two firms labeled i and j discharge pollution emissions ei
] e , 0 [ i ∈  (i = 1, 2, i ≠  j).  Each firm is visited by an environmental inspector who
reports its emission levels to a regulatory agency.  Firms pay an emission tax of t per
unit on reported pollution emissions.  Firms may, however, offer their inspector a
bribe of Bi to underreport emission levels.  An inspector who accepts a bribe, reports
emission levels denoted  i e ˆ  which may differ from actual emissions of ei.  We assume
that  i e ˆ  ≤  ei, so that the inspector is unable to exaggerate true pollution levels.
6  The
reward to each inspector for reporting emissions of  i e ˆ  is given by wt i e ˆ .  Thus, each
inspector receives a proportion w of the tax paid by the firm.  Not unrealistically, it is
supposed that w < 1 so that some fraction of the emission tax revenue accrues to the
government.
The inspectors' remuneration is linked to reported emissions ( i e ˆ ), since it is
assumed that the regulator cannot observe the actual level of emissions (ei).  It is
useful to note, that in order to encourage truthful reporting, the compensation schedule
should be negatively related to the degree of underreporting (i.e. (ei -  i e ˆ )).   However,
such a schedule cannot be implemented here as the regulator has no knowledge of true
emission levels (ei), and must therefore condition the inspectors’ remuneration on
reported emissions ( i e ˆ ).
                                                
6   This implies that the firm can provide irrefutable evidence of emission levels to the regulatory
agency if it so chooses.10
While the regulatory authority cannot observe actual emission levels, it knows
that ceteris paribus the lower the total level of reported emissions, the greater is the
probability that at least one inspector has accepted a bribe to underreport true emission
levels.  Specifically, let the probability that the regulator attaches to a bribe being
accepted by the inspectors be:
K
e ˆ e ˆ K j i − −
= σ                    (1)
where: K > 0 is an exogenously given parameter
7
It is assumed that σ  also defines the probability that the regulator initiates an audit of
emission levels.
8  Moreover, the probability that an audit successfully detects true
pollution levels is exogenously given by β  ∈  (0, 1).  β  may thus be viewed as an
indicator of the efficiency of the judicial process.  An inspector found guilty of
underreporting emissions is fined P(ei -  i e ˆ ) (where; P ≥  t), while the firm is fined F(ei
-  i e ˆ ) (where; F ≥  t).   The probability that an audit occurs and leads to successful
prosecution is: λ  = σβ .
Suppose that firm i decides to bribe its inspector an amount Bi > 0 to report
emission levels of  i e ˆ  < ei.  The expected gains to the firm from offering a bribe are
given by:
)) e ˆ e ( F e ˆ t B ( te i i i i i i − λ + + − = ∆ (i =1,2), (i≠ j) (2)
The first term in (2) represents the amount that must be paid in emission taxes if the
firm does not offer a bribe.  The remaining terms represent the expected costs of a
bribe.  Thus, a bribe of Bi induces the inspector to report  i e ˆ , so that the firm pays
                                                
7 Observe that as K rises the probability of an audit being initiated increases.  Thus, K may be seen to
depend on the resources available to the regulator to conduct an audit.  Conversely, as reported
emissions rise, then σ  declines.11
emission taxes of t i e ˆ . With probability λ  a successful audit is triggered and the firm is
fined F on its unreported emissions of (ei -  i e ˆ ).
Similarly, the gains to an inspector from accepting a bribe of Bi  from firm i is
given by:
i i i i i i wte )) e ˆ e ( P e ˆ wt B ( − − λ − + = Ω (i =1,2), (i≠ j) (3)
The terms in parenthesis in (3) describe the expected payoffs from accepting a bribe.
A bribe of Bi induces a report of  i e ˆ , and the inspector receives a reward of wt i e ˆ  from
the regulator.  With probability λ  a successful audit is initiated and leads to a penalty
of P being imposed on unreported emissions.
We begin by considering a situation in which the firms are inspected
sequentially by different inspectors and the order of inspections is common
knowledge to all players.  Without loss of generality assume that firm i is inspected
first.
By backward induction we begin by solving firm j’s problem.  Taking as given
firm i’s reported emissions, firm j and its inspector will choose to report a level of
pollution which maximise their joint expected payoffs from a bribe of Bj.
Specifically, the reported level of emissions  j e ˆ  satisfies:
) ( Max j j
e ˆ j
Ω + ∆ (4a)
Solving the associated first order condition for (4a), yields the following best response
function for j:
) e e ˆ )
) P F (
) w 1 ( t
1 ( K (
2
1




                                                                                                                                           
8 There are several other rules which could be used to trigger an audit.  For instance, in a non-sequential
setting, Chander and Wilde (1998) propose auditing the low reports with higher probability.12
Given knowledge of its rival’s reaction function in (4b), firm i and its
inspector choose reported emission levels to maximise their joint payoffs:
*)) ( *) ( ( Max i i i i
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i  is the quasi-reduced form probability of an
audit which is obtained by substituting (4b) for  j e ˆ  in σ .
Solving the resulting first-order condition, equilibrium reported emission levels can be
deduced to be:
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) P F (
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e ˆ j i i + β
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− + − = (5b)
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e ˆ i j j + β
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− + − = (5c)
Once the reported emission levels have been decided, the equilibrium bribe is
determined by a Nash bargain between the firm and each inspector.  Each party is
assumed to have equal bargaining power and the bribe is chosen to maximise the
following Nash bargain:
  ) ( Max i i
Bi
Ω ∆ (6a)
This results in an outcome where the firm and inspector equally share the net benefits
from underreporting the true level of emissions.  The equilibrium bribe is thus:
)) w 1 ( t ) F P ( )( e ˆ e (
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Firm j’s bribe is determined in a similar manner and is given by:13
)) w 1 ( t ) F P ( )( e ˆ e (
2
1
* B j j j + + − τ − = (6c)
Lemma 1 below describes a useful property of the equilibrium.  The proof of all
results are in the Appendix.
Lemma 1   If ei = ej  and  β  ∈  [ Kt(1-w)/[(K+2e)(P+F)], t(1-w)/(P+F)] then
]. e , 0 ( e ˆ and 0 e ˆ j j i ∈ =     
Lemma 1 informs us that, when both firms emit the same level of pollution, and if the
probability of successfully prosecuting the corrupt parties lies in a certain range, then
there exist equilibria in which firm i reports zero emissions, while j reports positive
emission levels.  This simply reflects the first mover advantage conferred upon firm i
which allows it to capture a more favourable position and report lower emissions.
Having determined reported emission levels, Proposition 1 outlines the
circumstances in which it is impossible to deter corruption.
Proposition 1:  If β  ≤  β
c then  j j i i e e ˆ , e e ˆ < <       and B*i,>0 and B*j>0.
Where:  β
c = tK(1-w)/((P+F)(K - ei – ej))
Proposition 1 is intuitively obvious.  It reveals that if the probability of successfully
prosecuting the corrupt parties (β ) is sufficiently small, the expected payoffs from
underreporting emissions always exceed those from truthful revelation.  It is therefore
impossible to deter bribing.
It is of interest to note that all corruption can be eliminated if the regulator can
adjust policies so that β
c = 0.  This, however, cannot be achieved by simply raising the14
probability of audits (K), since 
) F P (







 > 0.  Moreover, increasing the fines
(F +P) only lowers β
c to zero as the fines approach infinity (i.e.  0 Lim
c




taking can, however, be eliminated if all tax revenues are paid to the inspector (i.e. w
= 1).
9  In the following Section we demonstrate that by introducing uncertainty into
the sequence of inspections it is easier to prevent bribe taking.
III. Uncertainty
In this section we consider the consequences of introducing uncertainty about the
sequence of inspections.  Specifically, the regulatory authority randomises the order of
inspections and informs all parties that with some probability θ  [(1 - θ )] firm i (j) will
be inspected first.  The game is thus one of incomplete information, where decision
must be based on announced probabilities and the best responses depend on
expectations.
10
We initially assume that there is no communication between the parties and
that decisions are based on information about the sequence of inspections provided by
the regulatory authority.  This assumption is eschewed later in this section where we
consider strategies which render communication between the parties unprofitable.  It
is demonstrated that the informational advantage accruing to the regulator makes
corruption easier to control.
The expected payoff to firm i from offering a bribe of Bi to an inspector is:
)) ) 1 ( )( e ˆ e ( F e ˆ t B ( te *
i i i i i i i σ θ − + θσ − β + + − = Θ  (7a)
                                                
9 If regulators are required to raise revenue to cover costs or confront budgetary constraints this is
unlikely to be an appealing policy choice.
10  The equilibrium of this game is thus Bayes-Nash. Note that this game reduces to the full information
sequential game of the previous section if θ  =1.  Moreover, as in the standard duopoly case, the15
The first term represents the amount that must be paid in emission taxes if a truthful
report is submitted.  The remaining terms describe the expected costs of a bribe.  A
bribe of Bi induces a report  i e ˆ , so that the firm pays emission taxes of t i e ˆ .  With
probability θ  the firm is inspected first and as noted in Section II, the probability of an
audit being initiated is defined by σ i*.  Conversely, with probability (1-θ ) firm i is
inspected second and the likelihood of an audit is given by σ .  An audit leads to
successful prosecution with probability β  and the firm is fined F on its unreported
emissions of (ei -  i e ˆ ).
11
Similarly, the expected payoffs to an inspector from accepting a bribe of Bi
from firm i are given by:
i
*
i i i i i i wte )) ) 1 ( )( e ˆ e ( P B e ˆ wt ( − σ θ − + θσ − β − + = Ψ (7b)
Reported emissions are chosen to maximise the joint expected payoffs of firm
i and its inspector:
) ( i i
e ˆ Max
i
Ψ + Θ (7c)
Similarly, at firm j reported emissions are chosen to maximise joint payoffs:
) ( j j
e ˆ Max
j
Ψ + Θ (7d)
where:  j
*
j j j j j j wte )) ) 1 )(( e ˆ e ( P B e ˆ wt ( − θσ + σ θ − − β − + = Ψ
)) ) 1 )(( e ˆ e ( F B e ˆ t ( te
*
j j j j j j j θσ + σ θ − − β + + − = Θ
                                                                                                                                           
imperfect information (i.e. Cournot) outcome only obtains when we require that neither firm is the
leader and each therefore plays a simultaneous game.
11 This objective function can be compared to a Stackelberg duopoly where the players know that firm i
moves first with probability θ  <1. Firm i will base its strategy on the expectation that it is leads with
probability θ  and follows with probability (1-θ ). The resulting equilibrium of this duopoly is Bayes-
Nash.16
For computational ease we focus only on the symmetric case where both firms
emit the same level of pollution ei = ej = e.  It can be verified that in equilibrium
reported emission levels are:
) 1
) P F (







e ˆi θ + +
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− β − θ + −
+ θ − = (8a)
) 1
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e ˆ j θ − +
+ β
− β − β + θ −
+ θ = (8b)
Equations (8a) and (8b) reveal that the emission levels reported by each firm increases
with the probability that the rival is inspected first.  This suggests that it may be
possible for the regulator to induce truthful reporting by manipulating the level of
information made available to the parties, through the randomisation strategy which
determines the sequence of inspections.
Lemma 2 specifies the range of values of θ  over which truthful reporting is
incentive compatible.  All proofs are in the Appendix.
 Lemma 2:   e e ˆi =  if  θ  <  θ i(β ) and  e e ˆ j =   if θ  > θ j(β ).
Where:  
) e 2 K )( F P ( ) w 1 )( 3 4 ( Kt
) e 2 K )( F P ( ) w 1 ( Kt
) ( i − + β − − − β
− + β + − −
= β θ
) e 2 K )( F P ( ) w 1 )( 3 4 ( Kt
) e 2 K )( F P ( ) w 1 )( 2 1 ( Kt
) ( j − + β + − − β −
− + β + − β − −
= β θ
Clearly, such a θ  is only feasible if: θ j(β ) ≤  θ i(β ).  Lemma 3a specifies the
circumstances under which θ j(β ) ≤  θ i(β ).
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≡17
Lemma 3a informs us that if the probability of a successful prosecution exceeds a
certain threshold level β
u then θ j(β ) ≤  θ i(β ), so that bribe taking can be deterred by
setting a θ  ∈  (θ j(β ), θ i(β )).  This condition is analogous to that outlined in Proposition
1 where it was shown that corruption can be prevented in a sequential game with
perfect information only if β  exceeds the critical level β
c.
Observe that corruption can be eliminated with the randomisation strategy
when β
u = 0.  The circumstances under which this occurs is outlined in the following
Lemma.
Lemma 3b: If either K ≥  
) w 1 ( t 4 ) F P ( 3
) F P ( e 6
− − +
+
, or if (P+F) ≥  
) e 2 K ( 3





u ≤  0
Lemma 3b reveals that the critical threshold level β
u can be reduced to a level
below any non-negative prosecution rate β , by either raising the frequency of audits
(K) sufficiently, or increasing the fines (P+F).  Corruption can therefore be eradicated
either by adjusting the penalty or the frequency of audits.  Lemmas 2, 3a and 3b thus
combine to suggest the following result.
Proposition 2: If θ  ∈  (θ j(β ), θ i(β )) and either K ≥  
) w 1 ( t 4 ) F P ( 3
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) e 2 K ( 3




u ≤  0 so that   e e ˆi =  and  e e ˆ j = .
Intuitively, the introduction of asymmetric information provides the regulator
with an additional policy instrument with which to influence reported emission levels
and bribe taking.  Thus, Proposition 2 reveals that uncertainty about the sequence of
audits allows the regulator to lower the payoffs from bribe taking and induce truthful
reporting by either raising the penalty, or the frequency of audits.  This contrasts with18
the results outlined in the previous Section where it was shown that when the
sequence of audits is known, increases in either the penalty or the frequency of audits
do not deter bribe taking.
The results thus far have been based on the assumption that institutional
structures can prevent unauthorised communication between agents.  Clearly, in the
absence of such constraints, firms and inspectors could collude and share information
about the actual sequence of inspections and thus frustrate the regulatory authority’s
attempt to inject uncertainty into the game.  We therefore consider a simple strategy
which is designed to deter information sharing.
Consider a confidentiality clause which forbids inspectors and firms from
disclosing information about inspections to unauthorised personnel.  This rule is
enforced by using a system of rewards and punishments.  An inspector or firm who is
approached by an unauthorised agent for information, is given a reward for disclosing
this to the regulatory authorities, if the information leads to successful prosecution.
The guilty party in turn, is fined for seeking access to unauthorised information, if
prosecuted.
Communication between inspectors will be deterred if the expected payoffs to
each inspector from exposing a rival who has communicated, exceed the expected
payoffs from colluding and sharing information.  Let γ s be the probability that
inspector s (s = i,j, i≠ j) approaches inspector r (r = i,j, s≠ r) for access to information
about whether an inspection has occurred.  Let α r  be the probability that inspector r
exposes rival s for communicating.  As before, β  is the probability of successfully
prosecuting inspector s when exposed.  Inspector s, if successfully prosecuted for19
breaking the confidentiality clause is fined an amount G, which is paid to rival
inspector r for exposing the misdemeanor.
The expected payoffs to s from communicating with r are given by:
Γ
c
s(α s, α r, γ s γ r) = γ s((1 - α r)[θ i B ˆ  + (1 - θ ) j B ˆ ] - α rβ G) (9a)
where:  i B ˆ = Bi + wt i e ˆ - σ *β P(e -  i e ˆ ),   j B ˆ  = (Bj +wt j e ˆ ) - σβ P(e -  j e ˆ ),]
To interpret this expression observe that s communicates with her rival with
probability γ s.  With probability (1-α r) she learns the sequence of inspections. Under
the randomisation strategy outlined earlier, the expected probability that s = i reports
first (second) is θ  ((1 - θ )).  If s reports first (second) her net payoffs are  i B ˆ  ( j B ˆ ).
However, approaching a rival for information risks prosecution.  With probability α r
the rival exposes the inspector and this results in an expected fine of β G.
In contrast, inspector s decides not to collude with probability (1 - γ s).  An
inspector who does not share information is compelled to truthfully reports emissions
when θ  ∈  ( θ j(β ), θ i(β )), and this yields a payment of Wte from the government.  With
probability γ r  the rival may approach inspector s for confidential information.  The
rival is exposed by s with  probability α s.  Inspector s then obtains a reward of G if
this results in a successful prosecution.  Thus, the expected payoffs from a strategy of
truthful reporting are:
Γ s(α s, α r, γ s, γ r) = (1 - γ s)(Wte + γ rα sβ G) (9b)
In what follows we focus only on equilibria where α k = 0 or 1 and γ k = 0 or 1
(k=s,r).  Each inspector either chooses to communicate with the rival (ie γ k =1) or not
(ie γ k =0).  If approached each inspector must then decide whether to expose her rival20
(α k = 1), or collude in information sharing (α k = 0 ).  Other possible equilibria would
require the use of mixed strategies, which do not appear to have an obvious
interpretation in this context.  Clearly the strategy chosen by each inspector must be ex
post optimal.  Lemma 4 below compares the payoffs from the various feasible
strategies.
Lemma 4: If G >(θ i B ˆ  + (1 - θ ) j B ˆ )/β  then, Γ
c
s(α s = 1, γ s = 0, γ r = 1, α r = 0) >
Γ s(α s = 1, γ s = 0, α r = 0, γ r = 1) >Γ s(α s = 1, γ s = 0, γ r = 0, α r = 1) > Γ
c
s(α s = 0, γ s
= 1, α r =1, γ r = 0).
Lemma 4 reveals that if the fine G is large enough then, each inspector gains from
exposing a rival and honestly disclosing emissions, when a rival chooses to
communicate.  The inspectors therefore confront a standard prisoner’s dilemma
problem.  Each gains by exposing its rival, even though both would be better off by
communicating.  Thus the best response of each is to set α k = 1 and expose a rival if
approached.  If each inspector expects the rival to behave in this manner, neither
chooses to communicate so that γ k = 0 and information sharing does not occur.  Thus,
unauthorised communication between the inspectors can be deterred by the simple and
cost effective expedient of offering a sufficiently high reward which is funded by the
penalty.
Even if communication between inspectors can be prevented, there remains the
possibility that firms may exchange information about the sequence of inspections.  It
can be verified that firms confront similar incentives and can therefore be deterred
from disclosing unauthorised information with a sufficiently large fine.  This is
summarised with greater accuracy in Lemma 5.21
Lemma 5: If H >(te -(θ i Q  + (1 - θ )Qj))/β  then, Σ i(α i = 1, γ i = 0, γ j = 1, α j = 1)
< Σ i
c(α i = 1, γ i = 0, γ j = 1, α j = 0) < Σ i
c(α i = 0, γ i = 1, γ j = 0, α j = 1).
Where: Σ i = (1 - γ i)(te - γ jα iβ H), and  Σ i
c = γ i[(1 - α j)(θ∆ i + (1- θ )∆ j) + α jβ H]
 ∆ i = t i e ˆ  + Bi + σ *β F(ei -  i e ˆ ); ∆ j = t j e ˆ  + Bj + σβ F(ej -  j e ˆ ), γ i is the probability that i
approaches j, α i is the probability that i exposes j when approached (i = 1, 2, i ≠ j).
Thus, by setting a reward and penalty R = Max(G, H) the regulator can deter
unauthorised communication between firms inspectors and induce honest reporting by
either adjusting either the frequency of audits or setting a sufficiently severe penalty.
IV A Numerical Example
This Section outlines a simple numerical example which provides an
indication of the relative magnitudes implied by the model.  The simulations are based
on the following values.  True pollution levels are assumed to be ei = ej = 10; t = 0.2 is
the tax on reported emissions; w = 0.5 is the proportion of the tax revenue accruing to
the inspector and β  = 0.4 defines the probability of a successful prosecution.  For
simplicity we consider a randomisation strategy where θ  = 0.5 is the probability that i
reports first.
We begin by exploring the impact of varying the fines for a given value of K.
Table 1 below reports the equilibrium outcomes as the combined fines (P + F) vary
from 0.1 to 1.
Table 1
Reported Emissions with K = 25 and ei = ej = 10
(F+P) i e ˆ  Full
Information
j e ˆ  Full
Information
i e ˆ  Uncertainty j e ˆ  Uncertainty
0.1 0 0 7.1 7.1
0.2 0 3.4 9.5 9.5
0.3 2.08 6 10 10
0.4 4.7 7.3 10 1022
0.5 6.2 8.1 10 10
0.6 7.2 8.5 10 10
0.7 8 9 10 10
0.8 8.5 9.2 10 10
0.9 9 9.4 10 10
1.0 9.1 9.51 10 10
Table 1 reveals that under full information about the sequence of inspections firm j’s
reported emissions always exceed those of firm i (Columns 2 and 3).  Moreover for all
values of the penalties in the considered range, underreporting occurs.  Columns 4 and
5 report emission levels under uncertainty when θ  = 0.5.  When the fine reaches (F +
P) = 0.3 truthful reporting is induced.  In contrast, under full information about the
sequence of inspections, a fine of 0.3 induces firm i to reports only 20% of its true
emissions, while j reports 60% of its discharge levels.
Table 2 explores the manner in which reported emission levels vary with the
frequency of audits (K) for a given punishment.  It is assumed that the penalty is set at
(F + P) = 0.5.
Table 2
Reported Emissions with Penalties (F+P) = 0.5 and ei= ej = 10
K i e ˆ  Full
Information
j e ˆ  Full
Information
i e ˆ  Uncertainty j e ˆ  Uncertainty
5 1.2 5.6 4.1 4.1
8 2 3.46 5.2 5.2
11 2.78 6.3 6.2 6.2
14 3.5 6.7 7.2 7.2
17 4.25 7.1 8.2 8.2
20 5 7.56 9.2 9.2
23 5.75 7.8 10 10
26 6.5 8.2 10 10
30 7.25 8.61 10 10
The frequency of audits associated with K = 23 induces honest reporting under
uncertainty when the fines are set at (F+P) = 0.5.  However, under full information23
about the sequence of inspections, at K = 23 firm i only reports 57% of its true
emissions, while j reports 78% of its emissions.  These numerical examples illustrate
the significant role played by information about inspections in a sequential setting.
Corruption cannot be prevented with either a fine or by raising the probability of
audits under full information.  However, under uncertainty the expected payoffs can
be reduced sufficiently to deter corruption with either a fine or by increasing the
frequency of audits.
V Conclusions
This paper has shown that in a game with sequential monitoring and full
information about the sequence of inspections, the firm which is inspected first enjoys
a strategic advantage and reports lower emission levels than its rival.  However, by
injecting uncertainty about the order of inspections, the regulator can deter bribe
taking even when the probability of a successful prosecution is small.  Intuitively,
bribe taking is only feasible because the regulator (principal) is imperfectly informed
about emission levels, while the inspectors (agents) are fully informed.  By
randomising the order of inspections the principal can generate uncertainty about the
strategic position of each agent and thus partly mitigate the informational advantage of
the inspectors.  This in turn makes it easier to implement policies (e.g. fines and
audits) which render truthful reporting incentive compatible.
In policy terms, this result highlights the need to find institutional structures
which can sustain the informational advantage of the regulator when the
randomisation strategy is used.  It is perhaps of parenthetical interest to briefly outline
one such institutional device.  Consider a monitoring system over say t = 4 periods.  In
odd periods firm i’s inspector submits a report and in even periods firm j’s inspector24
reports emissions.  The regulator announces that in period t =4, with probability θ
reported emissions from periods 1 and 2 will be used to determine whether an audit
will take place.  With probability (1 - θ ) reported emissions from periods 2 and 3 are
used to determine the probability of an audit.  Clearly in the former case i enjoys a
strategic advantage, while in the latter case the advantage accrues to j.
Communication between agents can do little to overcome the uncertainty generated by
this system.  Thus from Proposition 2 for any given β , the regulator can vary K, P, and
F to ensure that truthful reporting is induced.
Where institutional arrangements are unable to prevent communication
between agents, it becomes necessary to consider incentive compatible schemes which
prevent information sharing.  It was demonstrated that the simple expedient of a
reward which is funded by a fine can be used to deter communication if the agents
interact over a finite period.
There are a number of important issues which have not been considered in this
paper.  Firstly, we have not examined the consequences of infinite repetitions.  In a
stationary infinitely repeated game the results in Proposition 2 will be unaffected so
long as communication between parties can be prevented.  This is because the degree
of underreporting is determined by maximising the joint payoffs of the firm and its
inspector.  Since these payoffs are maximal, they are  impossible to improve upon in
an infinitely repeated game
12  However, infinite repetitions would provide inspectors
(and firms) with a greater incentive to communicate and share information about the
sequence of inspections.  To prevent such collusion it would be necessary to increase
the reward and fine for unauthorised communication beyond the levels necessary in a
finitely repeated game.25
Moreover, the results in this paper are based on a specific rule (equation 1)
which triggers an audit.  There are a number of alternative rules, which could be used
to determine whether an inspection takes place.  One such mechanism proposed by
Chander and Wilde (1998) is to audit low reports with higher probability.
13  This rule
is shown to be optimal in a model of tax auditing with no bribery.  It is not clear how
these optimality properties are affected by corruption and sequential inspections.  For
instance, under the Chander-Wilde rule both firms have a stronger incentive to collude
and submit the same report.  This then raises other interesting issues regarding the
sustainability and optimality of the audit rule even when it induces greater collusion.
These are important matters, which warrant further investigation in future research.
                                                                                                                                           
12  The payoffs lie on the Pareto frontier.
13 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for this suggestion.26
APPENDIX
Lemma 1
Let ei = ej = e, then from equation (5b) in the text:
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) P F (
) w 1 ( t
1 ( K (
2
1
e ˆi + β
−
− = (A1)
Solving (A1), observe that  i e ˆ  = 0 if:
) P F (
) w 1 ( t
+
−
≤ β  ≡β
ii (A2)
Moreover, from (5c) we have:
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Observe that  j e ˆ  = 0 if:
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jj.  Thus if β  ∈ (β
jj, β
ii) then  i e ˆ  = 0 and  j e ˆ  > 0.
Proposition 1:
Rearranging (5b) it is readily verified that  i e ˆ  ≤  ei if:
c
j i ) e e K )( P F (





Similarly using (5c)  j e ˆ  ≤  ej if:
c
j i ) e e K )( P F (





Moreover from (6b) and (6c) if  i e ˆ  < ei
  then Bi* > 0 and if  j e ˆ  < ej
  then Bj
* > 0.
Lemma 2:
Rearranging and manipulating (8a)  i e ˆ  = e iff:
θ  ≤  
) e 2 K )( F P ( ) w 1 )( 3 4 ( Kt
) e 2 K )( F P ( ) w 1 ( Kt
) ( i − + β − − − β
− + β + − −
≡ β θ (A6)
Similarly using (8b)  j e ˆ  = e iff27
θ  ≥  
) e 2 K )( F P ( ) w 1 )( 3 4 ( Kt
) e 2 K )( F P ( ) w 1 )( 2 1 ( Kt
) ( j − + β + − − β −
− + β + − β − −
≡ β θ (A7)
Lemma 3a:
Using (A6) and (A7):
θ j(β ) - θ i(β ) = 
) F P ( e 2 ) t ) w 1 )( 4 3 ( ) F P ( ( K
) F P ( e 6 )) F P ( 3 ) 1 4 )( w 1 ( K
+ β + + − β − + + β −
+ β + + β − − β −
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Solving observe that θ j(β ) - θ i(β ) ≥  0 iff:
β  ≥  β
u 
) P F ( 3 ) e 2 K ( ) w 1 ( Kt 4
) w 1 ( Kt




The numerator of (A9) is positive ∀  w < 1.
If  K > 
) w 1 ( t 4 ) F P ( 3
) F P ( e 6
− − +
+
  the denominator of β
u is negative thus β
u < 0.  Similarly,
if (P+F) > 
) e 2 K ( 3
) w 1 ( Kt 4
−
−
 the denominator of β
u is negative thus β
u < 0.
Proposition 2:
If either of the conditions in Lemma 3b hold and if θ  ∈ (θ j(β ), θ i(β )), then β
u < 0 so
that by Lemma 2  i e ˆ  =  j e ˆ  = e .
Lemma 4
Substituting in (9a) and (9b):
Γ
c
s(α s = 1, γ s = 0, γ r = 1, α r = 0) = 
j i B ˆ ) 1 ( B ˆ θ − + θ (A10)
Γ s(α s = 1, γ s = 0, α r = 0, γ r = 1) = Wte + β G (A11)
Γ
c
s(α s = 0, γ s = 1, γ r = 0, α r = 1) = -α rβ G (A12)
Γ s(α s = 0, γ s = 1, α r =1, γ r = 0) = Wte (A13)
Clearly, Γ s(α s = 1, γ s = 0, α r = 0, γ r = 1) > Γ s(α s = 0, γ s = 1, α r =1, γ r = 0) > Γ
c
s(α s = 0,
γ s = 1, γ r = 0, α r = 1).  Moreover if G >(θ i B ˆ  + (1 - θ ) j B ˆ )/β   then  Γ
c
s(α s = 1, γ s = 0, γ r
= 1, α r = 0) < Γ s(α s = 1, γ s = 0, α r = 0, γ r = 1).
Lemma 5
Let Σ i = (1 - γ i)(te - γ jα iβ H), and let Σ i
c = γ i[(1 - α j)(θ∆ i + (1- θ )∆ j) + α jβ H]
Then:
Σ i
c(α i = 1, γ i = 0, γ j = 1, α j = 0) = (θ∆ i + (1- θ )∆ j) (A14)28
Σ i(α i = 1, γ i = 0, γ j = 1, α j = 1) = te - β H (A15)
Σ i
c(α i = 0, γ i = 1, γ j = 0, α j = 1) = β H + (θ∆ i + (1- θ )∆ j) (A16)
Σ i(α i = 1, γ i =0, γ j = 0, α j = 1) = te (A17)
Σ i(α i = 1, γ i = 0, γ j = 1, α j = 1) = te - β H < Σ i
c(α i = 1, γ i = 0, γ j = 1, α j = 0) = (θ∆ i + (1-
θ )∆ j) if H >(te –(θ∆ i + (1- θ )∆ j ))/β .  Moreover, Σ i
c(α i = 0, γ i = 1, γ j = 0, α j = 1) = β H +
(θ∆ i + (1- θ )∆ j) > Σ i(α i = 1, γ i = 0, γ j = 1, α j = 1) = te - β H.  Thus the optimal strategy
for firm i is (α i = 1, γ i = 0) if  (γ j = 1, α j = 1).29
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